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I. INTRODUCTION

Our system of compensating the victim of an automobile accident
is ripe for reform. The attack is from all quarters. Though the ingredients
of the final resolution are not yet evident, it is quite clear that some
changes will be made-and soon.
The current assault has roots in the groves of academe. For, today,
no discussion of the problem is complete without devoting major consideration to the book published in 1965 by Robert E. Keeton and
Jeffrey O'Connell, Professors of Law at Harvard and the University of
Illinois respectively. Entitled Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: A
Blueprint for Reforming Automobile Insurance,' their book is the result
of a two-year study of automobile claims systems. A staff of twenty-two
persons was employed, and the result is a book of colossal proportions.
The problem has been studied before,2 and other solutions have been
offered. However the Keeton and O'Connell effort is unique in its depth
and in the exhaustive detail of the proposed solution. No other planner
has gone so far as to draft model legislation, whereas Keeton and
O'Connell's proposed "Motor Vehicle Basic Protection Insurance Act"
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student instructor in Research
& Writing for Freshmen.
1. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUE[hereinafter cited as KEETON &
PRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965)
O'CONNELL].

2. See section III A of this article.
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is a complete package which covers forty pages of their book.3 It is ready
for adoption by any law making body so inclined. In fact, several state
4
legislatures are already considering the plan.
But academia is not the only source of unrest. "Public dissatisfaction" has manifest itself in the political arena. Congressional investigations have already begun, 5 and many commentators feel that federal
regulations of insurance are "in sight."' It is not clear to what extent the
pending federal intervention has been engendered by the KeetonO'Connell plan. Perhaps both the plan and the investigations have grown
from the same sources of discontent. But whatever the causal relationship, clearly the Keeton-O'Connell plan, and others like it, come at a
time when the political power structure is highly receptive.
Though slow to react, the insurance industry has not failed to recognize the signs of change. Industry leaders resist federal control 7 and the
new plans,8 but there is an air of resignation in a surprising number of
their comments.9 In fact, the question in the minds of many leaders
seems to be not whether there will be increased federal regulation, but
rather how the industry should "adapt"'1° when increased federal regulation becomes a reality."
3. KEETON

&

O'CONNELL 299-339.

4. In Massachusetts the Keeton-O'Connell plan has been introduced in the form of a
bill which the House of Representatives has already approved.
5. An investigation of the automobile insurance industry by the staff of the House
antitrust subcommittee has been ordered by Chairman Emanuel Celler, (D., N.Y.). Miami
Herald, July 21, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
6. Federal Regulation in Sight, TRIAL, Dec./Jan. 1966-67, vol. 3, at 56; Expanding
Great Society Programs Make Federal Control of Insurance Inescapable, TRIAL, June/July
1966, vol. 2, at 50.
7. Kemper, The FederalSignposts: Danger Ahead, 532 INs. L.J. 267 (1967). The author
is president of Kemper Insurance Companies. The article begins:
"Less than a year ago a wave of shock swept through the insurance industry when
the chief executive of a large insurance company publicly expressed the thought
that federal regulation might be preferable to regulation by the 50 states, and
might be "inescapable." The immediate reaction can be expressed in one word:
"Heresy l" The secondary reaction was much more interesting: all of us began asking ourselves if perhaps he was right."
See also Two Chief Executives Urge Reevaluation of Industry Positions on Auto Insurance, BEST'S INSURANcE NEWS (FIaE AND CASUALTY EDITION), Dec. 1966, vol. 67, at 10.
8. Marryott, A Response to Critics of the Automobile Insurance-Tort System: New
Concepts to Protect Tragic Victims, 533 INS. L.J. 350 (1967) ; Marryott, The Tort System
and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-O'Connell Proposal, 52 A.B.A.J. 639 (1966).
9. See Expanding Great Society Programs Make Federal Control of Insurance Inescapable, supra note 6, at 50, where the president of the Royal-Globe Insurance Company
is reported to have
"... urged all segments of the industry to recognize possibility of federal control
and (to have) suggested consideration be given now to adapt the industry to
federal regulation without sacrificing independent and competitive phases."
10. Id.
11. Wise, Insurance-Government Partnership, BEST'S INSURANCE NEWS (FIRE AND
CASUALTY EDITION), July 1966, vol. 67, at 46. The author is general manager of the American Mutual Insurance Alliance. He said:
Despite the obvious dangers involved, it seems that we are being forced to consider programs under which government will subsidize certain types of risks at

1967]

AUTOMOBILE COMPENSATION

There is a remaining interest group much less resigned, but no less
vocal, than the insurance industry spokesmen. These are, of course, the
lawyers. Both plaintiffs' and defense lawyers are united in their opposition to governmental regulation and to any plan which would bar the
injured party's right to sue in tort.' Since the Keeton-O'Connell plan is
most effective as a mandatory form of insurance (thus calling for governmental enforcement) and since it eliminates an injured party's right to
sue unless he has an out of pocket loss of over $10,000 or "pain and
suffering" over $5,000, most lawyers are opposed.
Thus the stage is set, and the battle has begun. The main protagonists are the insurance companies, the injured parties, the politicians, and
the lawyers. The results of their struggle will affect anyone who drives
a car or rides in one. The stakes are high indeed.
This paper will document the problems of the present system. The
Keeton-O'Connell plan will necessarily be given major consideration.
Weaknesses in the plan will be pointed out and a new suggestion offered.
It is difficult to find any area of this field not already covered by Keeton
and O'Connell's exhaustive book, hence the many citations to that source.
II.

THE SEEDS OF DISCONTENT: PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM

A. The Automobile as a Social Problem
At the most basic level, the discontent with our present automobile
compensation systems can be traced to a growing belief that the accident
toll on our nation's highways is a social problem.' 8 The magnitude of the
destruction is one factor which leads to this conclusion.
According to the National Safety Council estimates for 1963,
traffic accidents caused wage losses of 2 billion dollars, property
damage of 2.6 billion dollars, medical expenses of 450 million
dollars, and insurance overhead costs of 2.65 billion dollars. 14
These figures also provide an obvious answer to the question of why
the operation of automobiles should be singled out for special treatment
rates based on political rather than economic considerations. That being the case,
it behooves us to develop guidelines for shaping such partnership arrangements.
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).

12. See, e.g., Ames, The Automobile Accident Proposal: An Irrational Concept, 14 U.
FLA. L. REv. 398 (1962); Kuvin, A Critique of Auto Accident Compensation Plans, 11
FEDERATION OF Ins. COUNSEL 14 (1961); Kramer, Fallacies of a Compensation Plan for
Automobile Accident Litigation, 26 INs. COUNSEL J. 420 (1959); Lang, Compensation of
Victims-A Pious and Misleading Platitude, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1559 (1966); Weston, At Fault
or Not at Fault, That is the Question, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 264 (1965).
13. Johnson, Problems of Automobile Claims Administration, BEsT's INsURANcE NEws
(FmE AND CASUALTY EDITION), Sept. 1966, vol. 67, at 32:
As applied to the automobile driver, however, people have come to regard insurance as a means of shifting the injured person's loss not to the wrongdoer but to
society in general.
14. KEETON & O'CoNNELL at 12.
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and why it might be necessary to depart from the traditional rules of
tort liability in this area but not in others.
Another factor contributing to the prevalent feeling that the automobile is a social problem is the simple fact that in our march toward a
welfare state more and more activities seem to demand government regulation. Hence, more and more activities suddenly become "social" problems. Medicare, social security, unemployment payments, and the myriad
of other government programs nurture the current belief that "society"
must compensate the individual for his losses. Of course, the widespread
acceptance of private insurance has also contributed to this attitude. It
is no wonder, then, that the people seem "ready" for a truly "compensatory" automobile injury reparation system.
B. The Fault System: Too Little, Too Late
The "compensation" phenomenon outlined above has not been limited
to the social "program." With the emergence of strict liability, implied
warranty, res ipsa loquitur, and various statutory remedies (such as
workmen's compensation) this concept is now manifest in the very
fabric of our law. Indeed, there are those who feel that "our common
law system has become so nearly equivalent to a compensation plan that
there is nothing left to argue about."1 And, once again, the very existence
of insurance has had a profound effect:
(T)he spread of liability insurance has also meant an expansion
of the concept of negligence, as judges and juries have found it
increasingly easier to label a defendant's conduct negligent,
company
secure in the knowledge that it will be an insurance
16
-not an individual defendant-who will pay.
There is no question that the future of "fault" is tenuous indeed.
Critics of the present system build upon the inefficiencies and unfairness
of "fault" as a basis for establishing civil liability. 7 "Fault" is the
keystone of all the current problems and with its demise, so the story
goes, there will be an end to court congestion, delayed lump sum payments, excessive administrative costs (including attorneys' fees),
forced or pressured settlements, perjury, and high insurance rates. There
is scarcely any evil in the present system which does not owe its existence
to our stubborn insistence upon finding a man at "fault" before finding
him liable. Thus, most all new compensation plans dispense with "fault"
in one degree or another.
Keeton and O'Connell make several assaults upon the traditional
15. Blum & Kalven, A Critique of Proposed Automobile Compensation Plans, 2 INT.
Soc. OF BARRISTERS Q. 26 (1967).
16. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 73.

17. Keeton and O'Connell say rather bluntly that "fault is an unrealistic criterion."
KEETON & O'CONNELL at 21.
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requirement that there be negligence precedent to liability. First is the
difficulty of "proving" negligence in an automobile accident:
Who can name all the factors involved in causing the collision?
Who can know or discover or describe the conduct of the parties
involved? . . .If the picture by some miracle could be truly
presented, who could pass a rational judgment in the allocation
of responsibility as between the parties on any basis of fault?"8
Second is the tendency of a personal injury case to develop into a
"theatrical extravaganza rather than rational, dispassionate hearings"'O
with the end result a "distortion" of the facts. Adding to this "distortion"
is the delay between accident and trial and the impossibility of asking
witnesses to "remember accurately the minutiae of the speed and placement of cars
in complex incidents that occurred in a few split seconds
20
years ago."1

They conclude by mentioning the various legal doctrines which
presently "impede" recovery 2t and the shortcomings of the common law
system of figuring damages. Indeed, say the authors, "The common
law system for estimating the amount of damages seems almost designed
to prevent accurate measurement."

2

This controversy over "fault" as a basis for liability is, no doubt,
the heart of the matter. A more detailed discussion will follow. At present,
its pervasive impact is evident in its integral role in the two major "problems" which remain to be discussed-court congestion and delayed payment.
C. Court Congestion
Court congestion is often advanced as one of the major evils of the
present system.2"
Already the effect on our courts of traffic victims' attempts to
gain compensation is crushing. The crowded court dockets,
particularly in large metropolitan areas, have long been a
scandal.24
Without doubt, court congestion is a problem; but there is some
debate whether it is a problem quickly solved by a large scale elimina18. KEETON & O'CoNNELL at 17, quoting from L,. GR:N,,

TRAFF1c. VICTIMS-TORT LAw

AND INSURANCE 66-68 (1958).
19. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 22.

20. Id.
21. Id. at 25.
22. Id. at 28.
23. See, e.g., Brownell, The Problem of Backlog: A National Shortcoming in Oulr
Courts, 42 A.B.A.J. 1032 (1956); Nims, Backlogs: Justice Denied, 42 A.B.A.J. 613 (1956).
24. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 13.
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tion of automobile accident litigation.25 There is also some question
whether court congestion is a major problem in all regions, or just
"particularly in large metropolitan areas." 26 The answers to these questions are crucial to the consideration of any new system of compensation.
D. Methods of Payment: Evils of the Lump Sum
If the injured party, or his heir, successfully navigates the Scylla of
the "fault" system and the Charybdis of court congestion, he may then
be the proud owner of a "judgment." Or, for one reason or another, he
may have forgone the gamble of courtroom combat and settled in return
for a "payment." In short, assume that he is now entitled to some compensation for his injuries. Even here the critics find much fuel for their
fire.
The inability of the current system to accurately guage damages, and
hence payment, has already been mentioned.17 In addition, studies indicate that those with slight injuries are "promptly and vastly overpaid," 28
(due presumably to the nuisance value of their claim) while those 'more
29
seriously injured are "grossly underpaid and only after long delay.
Other evils of the present system lurk in its insistance upon a lump
sum payment. Traditionally, settlements and judgments are for a lump
sum amount. This is due to the desire of both the court and the insurance
companies to terminate the incident with a certain degree of finality.
But the prospect of but one payment puts an unfair pressure on the injured party to settle his claim. Keeton and O'Connell tell of the injured
party with a potential claim who is forced to settle merely in order to
support his family and to pay his bills. ° And the worst part is that he is
forced to settle before he learns of the true extent of his injuries. The bargaining process they say, "places the victim of a severe injury at a cruel
disadvantage." 1
The lump sum payment is also inadequate in that it includes "not
only those damages that have already accrued but also a final estimate of
all the damages that will mature in the future. 3' 2 The common law system
is taken to task for its failure to provide something "sensible""3 like
"periodic payments for losses as they accrue."4
25. See generally W. Blunt & H. Kalven, A

CRITIQUE OF PROPOSED AUTOMOBILE

COat-

PENSATION PLANS (1965).
26. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 13.

27. See section II B of this paper.
28. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 37.

29. Id.
30. See "The Case of Jim Crane." R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH:
THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND INSURANCE REFORm 3-35 (1967).
31. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 38.
32. Id. at 28.
33. Id.

34. Id.
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Finally, in any discussion of the "problems" of common law damages, one always finds that familiar whipping boy-the "collateral source"
rule:
[U]nder which-in spite of the fact that tort damages are
primarily meant to compensate for loss suffered-the damages
a tortfeasor must pay are not diminished by virtue of the fact
that the claimant's loss has already been paid from some other
source (such as Blue Cross coverage or sick leave pay). This
means that a victim often recovers portions of his loss two or
even three times over. In turn, it means that some of the insurance moneys available to reimburse traffic victims go to enrich
victims already paid, rather than being available for victims not
reimbursed from other sources. 85
Hence, these are the "problems" which nourish the current discontent. All new proposals attempt to solve them in some manner, but
the relative merit of any individual plan depends on the degree in
which it successfully resolves these problems without creating new ones.
We turn then to Keeton-O'Connell and "Basic Protection."
III. THE

KEETON-O'CONNELL PLAN AND SOME OTHERS

This section will merely outline the basic essentials of some of the
plans which have been advanced. Particular emphasis will be placed on
the Keeton-O'Connell proposal. Of necessity, the treatment here will be
brief. Those interested in a more extensive analysis are referred to the
plans themselves or to Chapter IV ("Potential Models for Reform") of
8
the Keeton-O'Connell book.
A.

Some Early Plans

Though the present mood seems particularly conducive to reform,
reformation plans are not only of recent vintage. They date as far back
as 1932 with the introduction of the Columbia Plan.8 7 This plan proposed
strict liability for personal injuries caused by the operation of motor
vehicles. It also provided for compulsory insurance. The plan was closely
patterned after the recently adopted workmen's compensation laws. Payments were to be made periodically on the basis of scheduled benefits
and there would be no compensation for pain and suffering. As in workmen's compensation, the plan was to be administered by a special board.
The Columbia Plan was never enacted into law in any jurisdiction,
but it was the forerunner of a plan enacted in 1946 in the Canadian
35. Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 124.

37. Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, Report by the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (1932).
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province of Saskatchewan.8 8 This plan also provided a "schedule" of
payments. However, it differed from the Columbia Plan in that it provided
for compulsory personal injury "loss" insurance which paid benefits to
the injured party regardless of fault. But in contrast to the KeetonO'Connell plan, the tort action of the injured party was preserved. The
main objection to the plan then is that it does nothing to reduce the likelihood of litigation. In fact litigation is enhanced for:
(W)hat has a victim to lose by pressing his common law negligence action under a Saskatchewan plan? . . . (He) has everything to gain and nothing to lose by trying for the more generous common law damages including pain and suffering.89
Another objection to the Saskatchewan plan is that the "loss" insurance
is written by a government insurance organization. Also, the success of
the plan in a "relatively rural, isolated area ' 40 like Saskatchewan does
not necessarily indicate a similar success in the urban areas of the United
States.
In 1965 the Special Committee on Personal Injury Claims of the
State Bar of California proposed a compulsory form of loss insurance
similar to the Saskatchewan Plan.4' The receipt of payments under this
insurance would not "deprive the payee of his tort cause of action, if
any; but the insurer should be reimbursed out of any tort recovery for
payments made under this coverage.

' 42

The Committee rejected the

board,48

relying instead upon normal court
device of an administrative
channels, and no provision was made for a government monopoly of insurance.

The objections to this plan are familiar ones. Primarily, "this plan,
by simply adding loss insurance coverage, would clearly entail greater
costs than the present system. ' 44 This is because most people would still
want to press their tort claims despite recovery under the basic loss
insurance because of "the more complete reparation available to common
law, including damages for pain and suffering. '45 Since California does
not force a losing plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney's fee (as in
Saskatchewan), and since California has the contingent fee (as Saskatchewan does not) which makes litigation less burdensome for the plaintiff,
it seems clear that there would be much more litigation in the United
States, and hence more cost. Furthermore:
38. The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1946, 10 Geo. 6, ch. 11 (Saskatchewan).
39. KEEToN & O'CONNELL at 147.
40. Id.

41. California State Bar, Report of Committee on Personal Injury Claims (1965), as
printed in 40 J. ST. B. CALi'. 148 (1965).
42, Id. at 153-54.
43. Id. at 209.
44. KEETON & O'CoNNELL at 151.

45. Id. at 152.
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(W)ith the loss insurers being reimbursed from proceeds of tort
suits, many loss insurers would be likely to encourage or even
subsidize tort litigation on the part of their payees in order to
recover the loss insurance benefits paid.4 6
Another plan to which this objection obtains was proposed in 1963
by a committee of the Ontario Parliament.47 The Ontario plan proposed a
non-compulsory form of loss insurance providing for scheduled benefits.
The plan has not yet been adopted. Once again, "costs" are the major
hurdle:
[A]s in Saskatchewan and under the California Bar Committee
proposal, given the low levels of loss insurance benefits . . .
what has a victim to lose by pressing his common law negligence
action under the Ontario Plan?48
Professors Keeton and O'Connell have not been the only academicians to urge reform. Leon Green of the University of Texas and Albert
A. Ehrenzweig of the University of California have both proposed new
plans. Professor Green proposes a compulsory loss insurance which completely replaces the tort action for motor vehicle injuries. 9 Complaints
would be referred to a master appointed by a judge.
Green's plan is criticized for its "incompleteness," 50 and also because there is no "incentive to induce an insurer to settle promptly...
given the insurer's ability to delay settlement for bargaining purposes
by contesting the amount of damages." 51 This points up the major weakness in Green's plan which is a "failure to provide for periodic payments,"5 2 and which is, of course, one of the major criticisms of the
present system.
Professor Ehrenzweig's plan5 8 differs from that of Professor Green
in that it provides for compensation on a fixed schedule of benefits
rather than on the basis of common law damages. Also, Ehrenzweig's
plan is "voluntary" rather than compulsory. Payments would be made
periodically, the coverage would be offered by private insurers, and the
contract would provide for submitting disputed matters to arbitration.
The benefits would not include compensation for pain and suffering, but
the insurance would replace common law liability for injuries inflicted by
insured vehicles.
46. Id.
47. Ontario Legislative Assembly Select Committee on Automobile Insurance, Final
Report (March 1963).
48. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 158.
49. L. GREEN, TRAFnic VIcT sS-TORT LAW AND INSURANCE, 87 (1958).
50. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 163.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. A. EHRENZWEIG,
COMPENSATION

"FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR TME TRAFFic VICTIM-A VOLUNTARY

PLAN (1954).
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Ehrenzweig, like Green, is criticized for "brevity and incompleteness."5 4 The "voluntary" nature of his proposal is also subject to
criticism since the success of the
whole plan is dependent on voluntary purchase of full aid insurance by the great majority of car owners . . . (and) without

such mass participation, the evils of the present systemEhrenzweig so effectively castigated-would remain with
which
55
US.

But enough of history. 6 Past plans were discussed to provide a
background for the Keeton-O'Connell proposal. The discussion was
necessarily brief. Most emphasis was on the "objections" to previous
plans because the Keeton-O'Connell plan is best understood as an attempt
to surmount these prior shortcomings. The idea of "Basic Protection" is
not new. Keeton and O'Connell have merely reshaped the clay into an
attractive model which they hope is not subject to the same faults
as previous plans.
B. "Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim": The Strongest Challenger
The intricacies of the Keeton-O'Connell plan are set out in the forty
page "Proposed Motor Vehicle Basic Protection Act."157 But, basically,
their proposal is this:
(1) Development of a new form of compulsory automobile insurance (called basic protection insurance), which in its nature
is an extension of medical payments coverage. It compensates all
persons injured in automobile accidents without regard to fault
for all types of out of pocket personal injury losses up to limits
of $10,000 per person. Whenever an insured's automobile is in
an accident and he, or a guest, is injured, his own insurance
company will compensate him or his guest.
(2) Enactment of legislation granting to basic protection insureds an exemption from tort liability to some extent-an
exemption eliminating tort liability entirely in those cases in
which damages for pain and suffering would not exceed $5,000
and other tort damages would not exceed the $10,000 limit of
basic protection coverage. In all other cases, the effect of the
exemption is to reduce the tort liability of basic protection insureds by approximately these same amounts.5
54. KEETON & O'CoNNELL at 172.

55. Id. at 175.
56. We have not attempted to discuss all the plans that have been offered. Among the
most notable of those omitted is that proposed by Professors Clarence Morris and James
Paul of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. See Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact oj Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962).
57. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 299-340.
58. Id. at S.
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"Basic Protection" involves no government insurance programs
and retains the present marketing and claims processing procedures of the
insurance industry. It is similar to workmen's compensation in calling
for periodic payments without regard to fault as losses accrue, but unlike
it in the lack of a fixed schedule of benefits and the preservation of the
tort action for cases of severe injury.
Thus, the most novel feature of the plan is not the mandatory "loss"
insurance (which we have seen before in previous proposals), nor the
retention of the tort remedy (the Saskatchewan Plan retained the tort
remedy too), but rather the manner in which both of these divergent
means of reparation are combined-without the costly process of "overlapping." The "cost" factor (we remember from objections to the
Saskatchewan, California, and Ontario plans) is prohibitive when one
can recover under "loss" insurance and at the same time bring an action
in tort for common law damages. The "loss" insurance payments in many
instances finance the common law recovery and reduce the injured party's
incentive to settle. "Basic Protection" eliminates this problem by "preserving" the tort action only for damages beyond the limits of Basic
Protection coverage ($10,000) or for a "pain and suffering" claim of
over $5,000.
This "unique" feature is, in many ways, a compromise intended to
satisfy both the "tortists" and the "compensationists." To those who
favor the fault concept ("tortist") Keeton and O'Connell can show how
it is retained for all "serious" injuries (over $10,000), and to those who
favor compensation without regard to fault ("compensationist") Keeton
and O'Connell can point to the fact that their plan institutes this procedure for the "majority" of all injuries. However, after castigating "fault"
for being an "unworkable" and "unrealistic" criterion,5 9 Keeton and
O'Connell are hard put to explain why it suddenly becomes "realistic"
and "workable" when damages reach the magic figure of $10,000. This
is particularly true in view of their pronouncement that one of the
primary weaknesses of the present system is its failure to fully compensate the "seriously" injured. By retaining the fault concept for serious
injuries, Keeton and O'Connell have failed to solve the very problem
60
which they deemed so pressing in urging the need for reform. For they
then said that the greatest need would arise in the cases involving the
59. Id. at 23.
60. However, Keeton and O'Connell do maintain that Basic Protection:
(S)ignificantly improves the lot of the severely-even the catastrophically-injured victim. It pays him his first $10,000 of out of pocket loss promptly as it accrues
-an invaluable aid during the trying period following the accident. These payments,
in addition to tiding the victim over until he can make other arrangements to
adjust to the changed conditions resulting from the catastrophe, will also save
him from the relatively helpless bargaining position he now occupies in prosecuting
his tort claim.
Id. at 269-70.
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greatest amount of damages-not cases involving amounts of less than
$10,000.
Though they attempt to show "special reason for preserving tort
actions for more serious cases,"'" the Professors are well aware that
"the concept of liability based on fault is deeply rooted in our society
62
It seems clear that the primary
and will not be lightly cast aside."1

motive in retaining the tort action for "serious" injuries is a political
one. They note that:
(P)roposals to eliminate the common law action for negligence
arising out of automobile accidents are perhaps doomed to
founder 68as unable to muster the necessary widespread political
support.
This then is "Basic Protection" at the most basic. We have only attempted to describe the general characteristics. To appreciate the full
scope and impact of this proposed legislation one must read the act itself
or at least a more complete rendition than we have included. Indeed, in
fairness to Keeton and O'Connell, perhaps this should be a requirement
for those who read further.
IV.

BASIC PROTECTION:

A

NEW LOOK AT SOME OLD PROBLEMS

Our effort has thus far been a reportorial one-to give the reader
some background in this field, to acquaint him with recent developments,
and to enable him to see some of the forces behind this small revolution.
The remainder of the paper will, hopefully, involve more original thinking. In this section we will see how successfully the authors of "Basic
Protection" have achieved their purposes. This will involve another look
at the "problems" they set out to overcome. In the concluding section
we will offer a solution of our own.
A. Court Congestion
Crowded dockets and the consequent delay in trial is a serious
problem in several large metropolitan areas, 64 but it is not a problem
in every area or even in every large metropolitan area.65 Several jurisdictions which were crowded have since reduced their backlog by one
means or another.66 Keeton and O'Connell's discussion of the problem
61. Id. at 270.
62. Id. at 271.
63. Id.
64. See generally ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); e.g.,
Brownell, The Problem of Backlog: A National Shortcoming in Our Courts, 42 A.B.A.J.
1932 (1956); Nims, Backlogs: Justice Denied, 42 A.B.A.J. 613 (1956).
65. See note 68 infra.
66. See McDevitt, Arbitration: Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Compulsory Plans, 513
INs. L.J. 588 (1965); Tydings, Management Consultants Can Break Case Logjams in Nation's Courts, TRIAL, Feb./Mar. 1967, vol. 3, at 26; Zal, The Philadelphia Story on Court
Congestion, TRIL, April/May 1967, vol. 3, at 52.
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is replete with instances where "streamlining and reform ... (have re-

duced) the jury trial waiting period from four years to below one and
three quarter years." 67 They point out, however, that after this reform a
certain amount of congestion reoccurred. But the point is that a direct
approach to this problem is often successful. A local operation is often
enough to solve a local problem. It seems improper to impose a treatment
upon the healthy parts of the body as well as the sick ones. Similarly,
it seems unfair to take the right to sue from a person in Canostota, New
York, merely because the person in New York City faces a crowded
docket.
Perhaps this view is influenced by the fact that our vantage point is
Dade County, Florida, where Miami is located (which with over a
million people must qualify as a metropolitan area), and where there is
a mere seven month delay from service of answer to trial. 8 But the
point is that if Miami can do this without restricting any right to sue,
then other cities should be able to also. And the point is that the Miamian's right to go to court should not be subverted just because some other
city is unable to solve its congestion problems. So much for the shotgun
approach of Basic Protection.
But there is also some question whether, even if adopted, the Basic
Protection plan would reduce litigation and hence court congestion. First,
the proposed statute retains the fault principle in five categories of motoring claims: (1) all property damage claims, (2) the first $100 of personal
injury claims, (3) damages "otherwise recoverable" which exceed
$10,000, (4) injuries causing death, and (5) injuries to several persons
where the damages exceed the allocated basic protection.69 With this
much left for the courts and with the sensitivity of attorneys to "pain
and suffering" (which, if there is any at all, seems always to be worth
more than $5,000) there is some question how much litigation the plan
will actually remove from the courts.
Keeton and O'Connell may also be haunted by their own objections
to past compensation plans. They often maintained that other plans
failed to reduce the court workload because the injured party, once compensated by "loss" insurance, would have "nothing to lose" by then also
pursuing his tort action.70 Professor Green of New York University makes
this same criticism of the Basic Protection plan:
67. KEETON & O'CoNNELL at 13.
and also: "(A)ccording to date published in August, 1964, the delay in Worcester County
had been reduced to twelve months." Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 14. The authors relied on the Institute of Judicial Administration, State Trial
Courts of General Jurisdiction-Personal Injury Cases 4 (Calendar Status Study, 1964).
69. Green, Basic Protection and Court Congestion, 2 INT. Soc. OF BARRISTERS Q. 38, 41
(1967).
70. See note 48 supra.
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The proposed statute provides for the payment of attorney's
fees for basic protection claimants. A plaintiff's lawyer would
have everything to gain and nothing to lose by trying for a big
verdict in a tort suit, secure in the knowledge that he and his
client would be taken care of by basic protection no matter what
happened in the lawsuit.7 '
This is a sound objection. Fortunately for us, in a recent article
Keeton and O'Connell attempted to rebut this remark by Professor
Green. They maintained that:
In point of fact, a lawyer will have a great deal to lose by
bringing a tort action in the ordinary case. Take the case with
$500 medical loss and $1,000 wage loss. If the lawyer brings
a tort suit in such a case after the basic protection plan is
adopted, he cannot possibly recover more than $10,000 in out
of pocket loss, and unless he does his client (and thus he)
will get nothing under that category either. Thus the lawyer
has everything to lose by bringing such tort suits-he will lose,
in Lincoln's phrase, his entire stock in trade, his time and
energy. 2
True, the lawyer would have everything to lose by bringing suit on
a claim so small as this. In fact, even before Basic Protection, he would
not have much to gain by contesting this. Hence, even now, few claims
this small ever get to court. So it does not appear that the Professors
have met Green's objection with great force. Clearly he was not referring
to claims of $1,500. His criticism is only meaningful when "pain and
suffering" is substantial. Then the choice is one of alleging $5,000 worth
of pain and suffering, never getting to court and never recovering anything (because Basic Protection provides for a $5,000 pain and suffering
"exemption"), or of alleging more than $5,000 worth of pain and suffering, getting to court, and perhaps recovering something (what the jury
awards minus the $5,000 exemption). The person with a substantial pain
and suffering claim would surely be well advised to allege more than
$5,000 worth and take it to a forum where there is a chance of collecting
something. And he could do so in good faith, for the price tag on pain
and suffering is conjectural at best. What does he have to lose? And as
an aside, we wonder if the public, and the jury, can accept the proposition
that pain must be endured for free up to the first $5,000, but after that
will be paid for.
Apart from pain and suffering, what now of the man with a damage
claim of more than $10,000. With Basic Protection payments improving
his "bargaining position" (or "financing the litigation" of you please)
71. Green, supra note 69, at 43.
72. Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection: A Rebuttal to Its Critics, 53 A.B.A.J.
633, 637 (1967).
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he too will have "nothing to lose" by litigating his cause. So litigate he
will.
But there are other problems. Unlike workmen's compensation
(which made some lawyers rich anyway), the administration and enforcement of Basic Protection is completely in the hands of the court.
Not only is the common law tort action retained for any claimant who believes his interests will be better served by pursuing
it, but traditional court remedies are contemplated as the
exclusive means of enforcing the provisions of the basic protection coverage. In other words, the courts are in reality made
the administrators of the plan and charged
with the watch dog
73
responsibility for seeing that it works.
The addition of a whole new area for dispute (on the Basic Protection
Policy itself) may, indeed, add to the burden of the courts. Professor
Green maintains that the statute "turns the courts into administrative
tribunals, charged with the responsibility of investigating, policing and
enforcing the myriad details of the plan, 7' and that this only serves to
"increase congestion and delay and, consequently, would not serve the
'
ends of justice.

75

Green's theory is supported by the length of the statute and its
resultant complexity and ambiguity. Like the Internal Revenue Code, a
statute which is so extensive and has such a great impact on so many
people is bound to generate disagreements over
its meaning. And many
76
of these disagreements will end up in court.
To conclude the congestion problem on a rather gloomy note: many
cases are now settled, and hence kept out of court, just because of the
delay problem. One theory is that were the delay reduced, the incentive
to settle these cases would disappear, and they would come forward to
crowd the dockets again. Professor Conard of Michigan states the
problem in this manner:
For every injury case now reaching trial, there are seven more
suits which are settled before trial, and the long delay is one
of the reasons for settling. A slight reduction in delay will surely
bring additions to the backlog of cases seeking trial. And behind
the woodpile of filed cases lies a forest of unfiled cases which
might become filed cases if court procedures were more expeditious.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Green, supra note 69, at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 43-45.
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Now this is a sobering thought. Only the successful measures taken by
some courts to reduce congestion belie the truth of this proposition. For
were it absolutely valid, then no measure would succeed. Keeton and
O'Connell, acknowledging this problem,7" admit that delay in court
"may well be one of those frustrating instances in which success breeds
new failure-in which climbing upward is ineluctably followed by
'79
falling back just as far."

B. Prompt Payment
Any new plan must provide for immediate and periodic payments
to the injured person. There are two reasons for this. The first is the
purely social one of preventing the injured person or his family from
becoming public charges, or at least from the disastrous financial consequences of a serious injury and long periods of hospitalization or incapacity. The second is to remove the pressure to settle which the present
system forces upon the injured party. The withholding of any payment
until settlement places the injured person "in a pathetically inadequate
bargaining position with the insurance company."8 0
Basic Protection provides for prompt periodic payments by the
injured party's own insurance company. It is thus immune from criticism
on this point. But there is some question as to how great is the present
system's failure to compensate the victim. Of course, it depends on the
"victim." Keeton and O'Connell's "tear-jerker"8 " is a working man
with virtually no other sources of reparation, who, were it not for Basic
Protection to the rescue, would be standing in a soup line, his children
urchins on the street. In contrast, Professor Conard's "victim" is a
carpenter who receives free emergency medical care provided by the local
municipality, has a group hospital insurance plan, a liberal sick leave
plan, disability benefits under social security, private medical insurance,
and workmen's compensation benefits.82 Clearly, this view is also extreme.
But the point is made that "those who lament the fate of the poor
traffic victim cannot afford to ignore entirely what he may receive from
'
other sources."88
Thus, perhaps the problem of periodic payments is not so critical
as Keeton and O'Connell would have us believe. Over 70 per cent of
the population has hospital or medical insurance, and a smaller number
78.
ing the
79.
80.
81.

"This possibility tends to cast doubt on the efficacy of many proposals for attackbacklog." KEETON & O'CONNELL at 15.

Id.
Id.
See generally R.

KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH: THE NEED FOR LEGAL

AND INSuRANCE REFORM, ch. 1., (1967).
82. A. CONARD, supra note 77, at 25.

83. Id.
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has disability insurance to pay them subsistence when hurt.84 Furthermore, there is evidence that these "other sources" of reparation are still
in their infancy.85
Since the end of World War II, the various forms of "social
insurance" have doubled every three to five years. 8 There is no indication that this phenomenal growth will not continue. Thus, in the future,
the average "victim" will more closely resemble the fiction of Professor
Conard than that created by Keeton and O'Connell.
But, despite the growth of outside sources of compensation, about
55 per cent of all payments to injury victims and their families still
comes from tort liability.87 Hence the failure of tort liability insurance
to provide for prompt and periodic payment to the injured victim is
still a very real problem. But, once again, this seems a problem better
dealt with directly than by wholesale destruction of the right to sue in
tort. Not immune to public demand, several insurance companies have
recently instituted "advance payment" programs designed specifically
for the situation where "claim payments are delayed for long periods
and injured victims are obliged to use up their savings and go into debt."88
Advance payment programs have been highly successful.89 The
more congenial relationship with the injured party makes settlement
more likely and since the payments aid in immediate rehabilitation the
total injury claim is usually reduced. Furthermore, with advance payment there is no chance of contingent fee collection, and 100 per cent of
the insurance dollar is going for compensation. ° One insurance executive
even tells of
two cases wherein the plaintiff's attorney explained that if the
company were going to be that fair with his client, his client at
this time did not need his services and recommended to the
insurance adjuster that he deal directly with the plaintiff in
hopes that an amicable settlement could be worked out without
legal services. 1
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id. at 72.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 63.

88. Auto Accident Victims Receive Advance Payments for Claims, Trial, Oct./Nov.
1966, vol. 2, at 43; See also Carpenter, Advance Payments in Liability Claims, BEST'S 1i,
SuANcE NEWS (FE AND CAsUALTY ED.), May 1967, vol. 68, at 30; McCartney, Advance
Payment Technique For Liability Claims, BEST'S INsTURANcE NEWS (FiRE AND CASUALTY
ED.), July 1966, vol. 67, at 21.

89. "We have yet to encounter a case which we believe has cost us any more money
because of advance payments." McCartney, supra, note 88, at 21.
90. Hartford Accident, Allstate, The Insurance Company of North America, Aetna,
Fireman's Fund, American States, Liberty Mutual, and many others are among the insurance
companies reported to be giving serious consideration or to have "by this time initiated a

program of advance payments and the use of rehabilitation in the third party liability
claims handling." McCartney, supra note 88, at 32.
91. Id.
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In short, insurance companies are increasingly aware of the need to
"exercise their imagination."92 They realize that if they do not solve the
problems themselves then the Basic Protection plan or something similar
will do it for themY Clearly, advance payment plans are a giant step in
this direction.
C. The Fault Concept
Keeton and O'Connell found "fault" to be "not always, but at least
very often ...an unrealistic criterion." 94 Their attack was a powerful
one. It centered upon the difficulties of proof, the distortion of trial, and
the various legal doctrines impeding recovery.9" When the smoke cleared
and the tort or fault concept was retained for "serious" injuries, the compromise seemed more due to political consideration than any real allegiance to the traditional remedies. 6 Furthermore, it seemed unjust to deprive everyone of his right to sue merely because the courts are crowded
in some metropolitan areas.
But apart from these considerations, there is a strong case for retaining the fault concept. And it is this "case" which makes any plan to
do away with "fault" unpalatable to the public."
"Progressive" theorists who would abandon the fault concept in
favor of a "compensation" system are not really so modern in their thinking. What they advocate is actually a return to the early English common
law concept which required that anyone causing harm to another must
respond in damages, irrespective of fault or intent to harm. 8 The present
system evolved only as society developed into a more complex structure,
and as it became evident that an "individual has the duty to act and live
responsibly in relation to his fellow citizens.""
This basic duty is the heart of the matter. Attempts to weaken its
impact generate resistance. Were one not responsible for his own acts
there might indeed be some absurd results:
92. Carpenter, supra note 88, at 32.
93. It seems to me that we have remained a mighty slow moving enterprise in an
era of tremendous change. In the process we have not created a favorable image
in the minds of the public; nor, indeed, have we produced much profit for our
companies. Is it any wonder that there are rumblings of change that might be
forced upon us, such as a compensation system for automobile accident cases?
McCartney, supra note 88, at 32.
94. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 23.
95. See section II B supra.
96. See note 63 supra.
97. Marryott, Is the Keeton-O'Connell "Basic Protection Plan" Acceptable to the
Public? 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 416 (1967).
98. Dickinson v. Watson, 84 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1682); Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng.
Rep. 284 (K.B. 1682) See also Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908);
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-Ill, 7 HARV. L. REV. 441, 443
(1894).
99. Weston, At Fault or Not at Fault, That is the Question, 32 INs. COUNSEL J. 264,
266 (1965).
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The claimant could recover for his own injuries even if he
crossed the center line, without legal excuse, into the path of a
driver who was obeying the law. He could fail to stop at a stop
sign, crash a light, drive while intoxicated. He could drive recklessly in any number of ways and be paid for injury to himself
...

what happens to the sense of personal responsibility that the

law seeks to promote? 10

So proponents of the fault system are on firm ground. Furthermore,
they seem to represent the consensus of public opinion.
D. A Short Summary
Clearly then, Basic Protection is no panacea. There is well founded
doubt whether it will reduce court congestion at all. And if congestion is
reduced, citizens in uncongested areas seem unjustly penalized by losing
their right to sue in tort. There is no indication that the problem of
advance payments cannot be solved by the insurance companies themselves, and in view of Keeton and O'Connell's disenchantment with the
fault criterion, it is difficult to explain why it is retained for injuries
beyond the arbitrary figure of $10,000. The "magic number" approach to
pain and suffering is also troublesome. The statute itself seems cumbersome and unduly complex. Some particular areas cry out for court interpretation.' 0 ' This, plus the court's role as administrator and "watchdog"
of the system, point to an increase rather than a decrease in costs.
Furthermore, there is no proof that the mass increase in benefits payable
will not result in even higher costs and hence higher premiums by insurance companies. And finally, any erosion of the fault concept is
questionable in itself.
Thus, the solutions offered by Basic Protection are less than perfect.
Perhaps they are even less perfect than the present system. But it is
still true that certain shortcomings of the present system have created a
situation ripe for change. The lawyer's duty is to ensure that the change
is for the better.
V. A NEW PROPOSAL
A. Some Background
Keeton and O'Connell proposed to lessen court congestion by severely restricting the right to sue. Under their plan, 80 per cent of all
people injured in automobile accidents (those with injuries of less than
$10,000 or less than $5,000 pain and suffering) will have no right to
100. Id. at 269.
101. For instance, lawyers and courts should certainly have fun with the act's definition
of "allowable expenses": "Allowable expenses consist of reasonable charges incurred for
reasonably necessary products, services, and accommodations." KFETON AND O'CONNELL at
305. (Emphasis added.)
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full recovery, even against one obviously at fault. This is perhaps the
primary objection to their proposal.
We believe that any new plan must preserve the injured person's
"right" to a full recovery in court no matter what the size of his injuries. Since court congestion is a local problem susceptible to local
solutions-a wholesale reduction in congestion does not seem worth the
wholesale loss of a traditional freedom. Thus, the new plan must reduce
litigation, but not at the expense of a right.
The compensation aspects of Basic Protection were deemed worthwhile. Periodic payments, immediately, to the injured party solve many
of the present problems. Hence we searched for a compensation plan
which did not diminish the right to sue. But the spectre of increased costs
has always challenged the co-existence of the right to recover for one's
injuries regardless of fault with the right to also sue in tort for a full
recovery. The traditional objections are that the compensation payments
will only serve to finance the litigation," °2 and that, once compensated, the
injured party will have "nothing to lose" by suing. 10 3 Keeton and O'Connell solved this problem of "overlapping" remedies and excessive cost
by relegating "compensation" to the small claims, and recovery in tort
to the large ones. In so doing, they sacrificed much in flexibility and took
from the people a large bundle of "rights."
Now it appeared to us' that both increased compensation and the
traditional tort remedy could exist simultaneously without excessive cost
and with a decrease in litigation if there were some incentive for the injured party not to sue. Keeton and O'Connell would arbitrarily restrict
the right to sue; we would make it voluntary with the injured party. The
departure from past plans is that our injured party may well have "something to lose" by suing. The advantage is flexibility. Instead of depriving
the victim of the right to sue, the new plan gives him the additional right
of compensation.
B. An Incentive Not to Sue
What then is the "incentive not to sue" which will make this plan
feasible? Money, of course. Quite simply, if the injured person decides
not to sue he will be entitled to more compensation. If he does sue he
will get less compensation; but, if he wins his suit, this compensation plus
the judgment may well increase his ultimate recovery. The choice is his.
Under his compensation coverage, the injured party would be entitled
to an immediate payment of, say, 75 per cent of all out of pocket losses.
102. See note 46 supra.
103. See note 48 supra.
104. Any originality in this idea is in large measure due to the inventive mind of James

E. Tribble, member of the Florida Bar.
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This takes the "pressure to settle" off the injured party and allows time
for the full extent of his injury to become apparent. If he then decides
to sue he can go to court. The insurer who has thus far "compensated"
him would have a right to be reimbursed from any judgment. If, however,
the injured party decides not to sue, then his compensation insurer must
pay, say, 95 per cent of all out of pocket losses.
This additional 20 per cent of compensation is the injured party's
incentive not to sue. It solves the cost problem created by retaining the
tort remedy along with a system of compensation without fault.105In short,
it answers the question "What does he have to lose by suing?'
C. A Two Party or Three Party System?
This "incentive not to sue" is the heart of our plan. Unfortunately,
it is just a starting point. We are not prepared to propose more than the
most rudimentary outlines of a new plan. Keeton and O'Connell criticized
other writers in this field for "incompleteness."' 1 6 They then pointed to
the exhaustive detail of their own plan. But complexity is not necessarily
a virtue, particularly when one's avowed purpose is to "reduce litigation."
Perhaps the drafters of the Internal Revenue Code might have been wise
to be a bit more "incomplete." At any rate, it seems unfair for Keeton and
O'Connell to find fault on this basis. With a staff of twenty-two and
financial support they could well afford to be complete. With the same
funding we might even be tempted to "flesh out" our proposal,
A basic problem is whether the "compensation" payments should be
made by the injured party's own insurer or by the other party's "liability"
insurer. This is the question whether we should have a "related-insurer"
system or an "unrelated" one. Keeton and O'Connell decided on the
former, and we tend to agree with them.
The present tort liability system is a classic example of a third-party
or unrelated insurer system. This is because the benefits are usually paid
to a third-party rather than to the insured. But the two party system has
several advantages. First, the injured party who presents a claim is dealing with an insurer of his own selection. This should "increase the
probability of a friendly and favorable course of dealings."'0 Furthermore, in the interest of flexibility, under a related insurer plan deductibles
are much easier to administer. A related insurance program also increases
the likelihood of prompt payment of economic losses as they accrue, and,
finally, it eliminates the situation in which an innocent party's insurance
company is forced to compensate an injured person who was completely
at fault.
105. See note 48 supra.
106. KETON & O'CoNNELL at 347.
107. Id. at 349.
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D. The Main Points
These are the essentials of the new proposal:
1. A new form of compensation insurance which pays to the insured who is injured in an automobile accident 75 per cent of his out of
pocket loss including medical expenses and loss in wages.
2. These payments are made periodically and without regard to
fault. If the injured party decides not to bring a tort action, his insurance
company will then compensate him for 95 per cent of his out of pocket
loss. These payments are retroactive. Upon deciding not to sue, the
injured party becomes entitled to 95 per cent of all out of pocket loss including those losses for which he was only compensated 75 per cent.
3. The plan is mandatory just as liability insurance is mandatory
in some states now. (A voluntary plan would work, but not as well.)
4. The minimum coverage is $10,000, but increased amounts of
coverage are available.
5. If the insured decides to sue, and obtains a judgment, his own
insurance company is entitled to reimbursement for any compensation
payments made. But attorneys' fees and costs are deducted from any
judgment before payment is made to the insurance company.
Explanation. This last provision is intended to lessen the hardship
on the injured victim who sues and recovers an amount less than the
amount he has already received in compensation. In this case, he must
give the entire judgment to the insurance company, but the provision
for attorneys' fees and costs prevents him from being out of pocket anything-other than the right to the additional 20 per cent of compensation.
6. If the injured party decides not to sue and to collect 95 per
cent compensation payments from his own compensation insurer, the
compensation insurance company then "takes over" the insured's cause
of action against whoever injured him. The insurer may pursue this action to recover "compensation payments" if it so desires.
Explanation. It may seem that this merely substitutes one suit for
another and would, therefore, not serve to decrease litigation. But several
factors reduce the likelihood of a lawsuit.
(1) The compensation insurer can only recover payments made
to the insured. It cannot recover for "pain and suffering" which is
one of the most litigated aspects of the present system:
(2) The compensation insurer is not as likely to sue for a small
amount as an individual is. The "nuisance claim" feature of the
present system wil be eliminated.
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(3) A claim between two insurance companies is less likely to
result in litigation than a dispute between an individual and an insurance company. The compensation insurer which sues to recover
for its out of pocket compensation payments will almost always be
dealing with the liability insurer of the party causing the injury.
Since "insurers ordinarily resolve their differences by arbitration
rather than litigation,"'"" the chances of the dispute getting to court
are at least reduced. Compulsory arbitration might also be a possibility.
7. By statute, persons negotiating a "settlement" with an injured
party are on notice that the settlement does not affect the rights of the
injured party's compensation insurer unless the insurer joins in the
settlement. The compensation insurer is entitled to reimbursement from
any settlement made by the insured.
Explanation. This is to prevent an injured party from "settling" his
claim and depriving the compensation insurer of the right to sue for
reimbursement.
E. In Conclusion
These are the main points of our new plan. We think it more satisfactory than any yet offered. Comments and criticism are welcome.
Nothing is more sure than change, and seldom has anything been so
ripe for change as the present automobile claims system. Those interested
in preserving what is best in the present system must do more than rebut
its critics. They must join together and advocate a positive program
which improves the system without destroying its most treasured
aspects.
108. Id. at 368.

